I suspect that Clausewitz's philosophical prowess isn't taken seriously enough. Sumida's Decoding Clausewitz definitely taps into some of the important philosophical implications of On War. Sumida, moreover, argues that Clausewitz was philosophically inventive and actually anticipated a number of twentieth-century philosophers. Namely, R.G. Collingwood, C.S. Pearce, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. I think that we ought to take Sumida seriously here and explore Clausewitz's contributions to a wide variety of philosophical problems. Of particular interest to me is Clausewitz's connection to R.G. Collingwood, pragmatism, Henri Bergson, and the philosophy of habit.
The connection between Clausewitz and R.G. Collingwood has been noted in previous posts, and has been acknowledged by a few scholars (Sumida, Gallie, Pomeroy). What interests me is their shared claim that history was the key to military and political education. Both thinkers, moreover, argued that historical study was at its core a purposeful perspective taking. Clausewitz writes in his account of Waterloo that "the main point of all criticisms of strategy, difficult though this may be, is to put oneself in the position of the decision-maker. If writers were to consider all eventualities, the great majority of criticisms of strategy would be totally without substance or diminish into minute distinctions of reasoning" (On Wellington: A Critique of Waterloo, Carl von Clausewitz, translated by Peter Hofschoroer 2010 U of Oklahoma Press, 38). The main thrust of Sumida's Decoding Clausewitz, further, is that Clausewitz's main goal was to make a theory that could enable one to intelligently surmise about the mental processes of past commanders, effectively reenacting their thoughts. Sumida consciously borrows the term reenactment from Collingwood. Both Collingwood and Clausewitz had rich and complex understandings of historical study, and the line that connects them is one thing I'm eager to see explored.
The connection between Clausewitz and Collingwood becomes deeper if we connect it to contemporary work being done on what is called simulation theory of mind. Simulation theorists seek to answer the question 'How do I know about other people's mental states?'. They generally answer that I know another mind because I am able to simulate that mental process for myself and project it and ascribe it to another individual. I know you because I am able to put myself in your shoes, I empathize with you, I reenact your mental state for myself. Simulation theory's strongest advocate, Alvin Goldman, does indeed acknowledge Collingwood's notion of reenactment as a precursor to his account of simulation theory.
The question of perspective taking and knowledge of other minds is thus a major issue in American philosophy of mind. Clausewitz and Collingwood contribute to this work in that, seeming to intuitively grasp the conclusions of simulation theory, they went on to develop practical educational programs based on the idea of purposeful perspective taking. Their work and simulation theory thus stand to mutually benefit one another. Simulation theory is a more robust framework for discussing the phenomenon of (historical) perspective taking which they simply called critical analysis or reenactment. Clausewitz and Collingwood in turn can elevate simulation theory by providing a model of how mental simulations, perspective taking exercises, can be used as a serious pedagogical tool.
Finally, as a quick side note, the notion of pedagogical simulation is already somewhat common among psychologists and by some in the military, but often as technological simulation rather than mental simulation. This is a significant point in that it taps into larger problems about our relationship with technology (especially in the military), and also has implications for the question of matter and mind. Pomeroy, in fact, argues that the military has attempted to progress much like the rest of the country, through technological advance, the manipulation of matter. We have not put a comparable amount of effort into our minds.
There is also a potential relationship between Clausewitz and philosophical pragmatism. In Decoding Clausewitz Sumida argues for a connection between Clausewitz and C.S. Pearce. I am currently reading William James's lectures published as Pragmatism. James asserts that the pragmatic method is all about asking if a philosophical claim brings about some concrete change in action or experience. If two sides of a philosophical debate leave the world unchanged in terms of practical experience and action, then it is a false problem that need not be pursued. Philosophy's business, on James's account, is about pursuing questions that have practical consequences for our lives. I suspect the relationship between pragmatism and Clausewitz is justified. I frankly haven't looked into it enough yet and am working on James.
I partly have faith in the connection between Clausewitz and pragmatism because there is an established relationship between William James and Henri Bergson. I am certain there is a lively connection to be made between Clausewitz and Bergson. One thing that Clausewitz, Bergson, and James all share is the claim that all observation must be fully individualized, always looking past general concepts to the particular reality beneath. Bergson, moreover, articulates a method for jarring oneself out of the perceptual slumber that has set in from years of unreflective engagement with general classifications. Interestingly enough, Bergson's method also involves perspective taking.
Metaphysics, Bergson believes, is a matter of entering into a diverse set of perspectives different from each other and different from our own. By entering diverse perspectives we change something in ourselves, and hopefully catch an 'intuition' of our movement through time, 'seizing the self from within' to experience the novelty that is perpetually emerging from time. This is why Bergson defines metaphysics as 'the science of dispensing with symbols': it is a method of breaking down the symbolic structures of our minds, the general categories that have habitually governed our attention. In breaking the general molds of our minds, we can immerse our selves into the particulars of reality, seeing the world more clearly.
Clausewitz's method of historical reenactment was absolutely meant to cultivate a similar kind of attitude, one that could look past predictive narratives or bogus generalized theories to see the real character of the situation at hand. This is why he wrote that the experienced soldier "reacts in the same way as the human eye does in the dark: the pupil expands to admit what little light there is, discerning objects by degrees, and finally seeing them distinctly. By contrast, the novice is plunged into the deepest night" (On War, 141, Howard/Paret translation). For Clausewitz success in war is about the ability to observe reality accurately. One must learn to see what actually is, not simply what kind of thing we are dealing with. Kinds of things won't do. This desire to have raw contact with reality, to learn to see it for all that it is, and not in terms of classifications, is the essence of Bergson's metaphysics.
Clausewitz's relationship to Bergson is rich not only in terms of perspective taking and a capacity for observing the particulars of reality, but also on the topic of habit. The notion of habit occupies an interesting position in western philosophy. For many modern philosophers like Kant, habit has been viewed as antithetical to freedom. It is seen as mechanical and unconscious and therefore not intelligent. Bergson and Clausewitz, however, have a more positive view of habit, and regard it, like Aristotle, as an aid to freedom and intelligence. Bergson was influenced by Felix Ravaisson who wrote the essay 'Of Habit'. For both Bergson and Ravaisson habit was a positive influence in human life, creating a bridge between the mechanical world of nature and the free world of mind, making room for freedom in a mechanistic universe. Clausewitz, too, seems to have a positive view of habit. "Habit," he writes, "hardens the body for great exertions, strengthens the heart in great peril, and fortifies judgment against first impressions. Habit breeds that priceless quality, calm, which, passing from hussar and rifleman up to the general himself, will lighten the commander's task" (Ibid.).
That Clausewitz viewed habit is significant for several reason. For one thing, the relationship between habit and intelligence and the question of habit cultivation are fascinating and need to be explored simply in terms of how they fit into Clausewitz's theory. Second, it allows Clausewitz to be included into a group of thinkers who took habit seriously like Aristotle, Ravaisson, Bergson, Collingwood, Deleuze, and probably others. Finally, that Clausewitz viewed habit so positively goes to show that he was not simply a student of Kant's philosophy (who had a negative view of habit), but a philosopher in his own right.
Anyways, that's all I've got for now. There are all these different avenues to explore, and what I've really done here is lay out my current research track. I'm currently doing writing on Clausewitz and simulation theory, I have an outline for an essay comparing Collingwood and Clausewitz, and I'm doing a lot of reflecting on the relationship between Clausewitz, Bergson, and pragmatism. I work full time, so it's tough to find the time. But I'll continue to try and think about this stuff.
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